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I. The General Theory of Admissibility of Illegally 
Gathered Evidence 
Theories of admissibility of evidence give insights into the concepts that 
ensure the reconstruction of facts, reliability of proof, fair trial and respect 
for individual rights in a nutshell. Often such theories have been developed 
gradually over many years, and - as a consequence - are not entirely 
coherent. The general theory of admissibility of illegally gathered evidence 
in German law, however, strives for this very coherence, being at the same 
time also complex for the reasons mentioned before, sometimes even con-
fusing, since it tries to serve both the establishment of truth and the com-
mitment to due process. 
It is often said that the German doctrine on exclusionary rules has its 
origins in a lecture given by Ernst Beling in 1903: "Die Beweisverbote als 
Grenzen der Wahrheitserforschung im Strafprozess" ([Exclusionary Rules 
- Limits for the Truth-Finding Process in Criminal Proceeding]). 1 Advo-
cating a doctrine on the exclusion of certain evidence, Beling, a visionary 
of his time, focused on how important it was that law enforcement was 
1 Beling, Die Beweisverbote als Grenzen der Wahrheitserfor~chung im Strafprozess, 
Bres!au 1903. ( 
_,_,_~ 
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exercised in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure introduced in 
1871 (Strafprozessordnung, StPO); furthermore he touched on issues con-
cerning the due process with regard to a general respect for the rights of 
individuals.2 After more than a century of political, economic and social 
upheavals as well as a techriological revolution in (secret) surveillance, the 
German theory on admissibility of evidence is, on the one hand, still com-
mitted to Beling's teachings, on the other hand, the post-war constitution 
(Basic Law/Grundgesetz, GG), implemented by an alert and ambitious 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG), offers a 
new basis with another reference system more concerned with human 
rights in general. Lately new influences and concepts, especially the idea 
of a fair trial and the watching eye of the European Court of Human 
Rights, have started to influence the theory on exclusionary rules as well. 
Today the different frameworks form a rather complex system for moni-
toring the use of illegally gathered evidence. Overall, however, two pat-
terns recur constantly: (1) An allusion to Beling's vision of staying clean-
handed while adhering to the rule of law, which mingles with the more 
modern concept of "fair trial", and (2) a focus on the protection of the 
individual's right to privacy - may it concern a suspect, a victim or a wit-
ness. 
When it comes to the violations of statutes ruling on evidence collection 
and use, the "clean-handed"-approach and "fair trial"-test both follow the 
doctrine on exclusionary rules (Beweisverwertungsverbote) handed down 
from the early twentieth century. Although they might form the basis for a 
coherent modem theory of admissibility of evidence considering due proc-
ess in the future, for the moment the traditional doctrine prevails. The rea-
sons for this are manifold: First of all, as is well known, jurisprudence 
naturally holds on to traditional concepts and absorbs more modern ap-
proaches only reluctantly. Second, in the German system the question of 
admissibility is confronted with the fact that professional judges ·of a 
criminal court themselves in delivering the final judgment resolve, whether 
a piece of evidence presented before the court may be used as such or not. 3 
Third, the question whether certain evidence illegally obtained is used for 
the fact-finding process is traditionally confronted with the inherent para-
dox that you have the choice of either including potentially valuable 
information or to fuel the doubt about this very evidence as it might be 
unreliable or unfair information and thus not suitable to support the estab-
lishment of truth. 
2 See also: Beling, Deutsches Reichsstrafprozessrecht (1928) p. 284. 
3 Weigend, in: Craig. M. Bradley (ed.), Criminal Procedure. A Worldwide Study, 2"d 
ed., Carolina Academic Press 2007, p. 254. 
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1. Constitutional or Statutory Rules 
German law knows no constitutional prov1s10ns and only few statutes 
which explicitly state exclusionary rules. Furthermore there is no general 
exclusionary rule which, for example, would render illegally obtained evi-
dence inadmissible as such. 
One of the few provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
explicitly asks for exclusion under certain circumstances (statutory exclu-
sionary rules - "gesetzliche Beweisverwertungsverbote") is § 136 (1) 2 
StP0.4 According to this provision the accused "shall be advised that the 
law grants him/her the right to respond to the accusation, or not to make 
any statements on the charges and, even prior to his/her examination, to 
consult with [a] defense counsel of his/her choice". A violation of this duty 
to instruct the suspect adequately leads to an exclusion of evidence. 5 Thus, 
in most cases, the courts have to decide without statutory instruction 
whether illegally gathered evidence triggers an exclusionary rule or not 
(non-standardised exclusionary rules - "nicht normierte Beweisverwer-
tungsverbote"); they do so mainly if a breach of rights is too eminent and 
thus taints the evidence (exclusionary rules on the basis of grave breach, 
see infra I.2.b ). Such cases form the main body on which the German doc-
trine on admissibility based an approach for exclusionary rules which are 
triggered by violations of rules, generally laid down in statutes on evidence 
collection. The pertinent rules, however, are not only to be found in provi-
sions on criminal procedure, but also originate from superior principles, 
such as constitutional law. 
The most prominent example for a violation of constitutional right en-
tailing the exclusion of evidence - according to case law and not to statu-
tory order - is the infringement of the right to privacy based on a broad 
concept of personal rights including the right to the free development of 
personality ( allgemeines Personlichkeitsrecht, Article 2 (1) and Article 1 
(1) GG). 6 
a) General Exclusionary Rules/Rules Relating to Procedural "Nullities" 
German law does not know the concept of nullity. It lacks a conclusive 
rule either in a constitutional or in a statutory provision for prohibitions on 
the use of evidence. However, German scholars and courts have developed 
numerous approaches in order to decide on the exclusion of a certain kind 
of illegal evidence. 
4 All StPO quotations in English are available on <www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/ 
StPO.htm>. 
5 BGHSt 38, 214 (27 February 1992). 
6 See infra II. La). 
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In order to understand the German doctrine it may help to know some of 
the basic terminology in this context. Apart from distinguishing between 
those exclusionary rules explicitly laid down in statutes (statutory exclu-
sionary rules) and those not expressly stated therein (non-standardised 
exclusionary rules), jurisprudence and legal scholars use different - partly 
overlapping - categories: 
(I) independent exclusionary rules ("selbstandige Beweisverwertungsver-
bote") - in general they lead to a strict exclusion of evidence: obliga-
tory exclusionary rules ("absolute Verwertungsverbote"); 
(2) dependent exclusionary rules ("unselbstandige Beweisverwertungsver-
bote") based on a grave breach of an evidence collection rule - in-
cluded are cases of strict or absolute, so-called obligatory exclusionary 
rules, which always lead to a ban of evidence, as well as cases of rela-
tive exclusionary rules, in which the judges weigh the pros and cons for 
an exclusion ("relative Verwertungsverbote").7 
The first category excludes evidence irrespective of the activities of agen-
cies concerned with law enforcement or rather regardless of misconduct, 
i.e. the violation of provisions on evidence collection. A typical example 
for an "independent exclusionary rule" is the prohibition directly deducted 
from the guarantee of privacy, which is part of a constitutional more 
general "right to free development of [one's] personality" based mainly on 
Article 2 (1) and Article 1 GG, including even more specified rights, such 
as the "Privacy of correspondence, posts, and telecommunications" in 
Article 10 GG as well as the "Inviolability of the home" in Article 13 GG8 
etc. Both, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) early in 
the Recording Tape Case9 and in the first Diary Cases 10 as well as recently 
in the Hospital Room Case11 and the ConstitUtional Court, BVerfG, in the 
7 See Koriath, Uber Beweisverbote im Strafprozess, Lang Frankfurt/Main 1994, 
pp. 15-16. Theoretically obligatory exclusionary rules can be both, dependent or inde-
pendent. The obligatory aspect refers to the effect, i.e. legal consequence, that an exclu-
sion of evidence entails; whereas the cause of the obligatory exclusionary rules can be 
either called "dependent" when the violation of a rule is not considered due to overriding 
aspects like privacy etc or regarded as "independent" as soon as rules on evidence 
gathering get violated. 
8 All GG quotations in English based on <www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm> or 
<www.geocities.com/iturks/html/documentsl2.html>. 
9 BGHSt 14, 358 (14 June 1960), (Recording Tape Case). 
10 BGHSt 19, 325 (21 February 1964), (First Diary Case); other diary case: BGHSt 
34, 397 (9 July 1987), in which a murderer elaborates his wish to kill in his diary. 
l1 BGH NJW 2005, 3295 (10 August 2005). 
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decision on electronic bugging of homes 12 and online searches 13 excluded 
evidence on the grounds that privacy might be violated. 
Thus it is mainly the second category, the "dependent exclusionary 
rules'', which relates to the exclusion of evidence because of its illegal 
collection or rather due to the violation of an evidence collection statute by 
law enforcement agencies or even by private citizens. 
Furthermore, jurisprudence controls, mainly as a sort of last resort, 
whether an investigation measure is used arbitrarily against somebody14 
and applies the "principle of proportionality" ("Grundsatz der Verhiiltnis-
miiBigkeit")15 to balance an individual's constitutional right of privacy and 
the state's interest in fighting crimes. 16 The BVerfG, for example, declared 
the search for and seizure of the client documentation of a drug coun-
selling agency unconstitutional, because in that case the intrusiveness of 
the search would have been out of proportion with the legitimate interests 
of law enforcement. 17 
Only recently courts have discussed the question whether the accused 
may waive an exclusionary rule, if he/she wants to introduce exonerating 
evidence while a statutory rule asks for the exclusion of that piece of 
evidence. 18 The question is not resolved yet. 
b) General Duty to Determine the Truth 
German courts, traditionally, are obliged to make out the truth. Thus a jus-
tification for the exclusion of evidence is necessary, because a court must 
consult all relevant evidence in order to search out the truth. 19 § 244 (2) 
StPO explicitly commits the deciding court to unearth substantive truth: 
"In order to establish the truth, the court shall, proprio mo tu [of its own 
accord], extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof rele-
vant to the decision." The statute points at the inquisitorial origin of the 
12 BVerfGE 109, 279 (3 March 2004). 
13 BVerfGE (27 February 2008) (1 BvR 370/07 -1 BvR 595/07). 
14 BGHSt 41, 30 at 34 (16 February 1995); BGHSt 47, 362 (1August2002). 
15 The German Federal Constitutional Court established this principle of proportio-
nality for cases dealing with compulsory measures in criminal processes. See BVerfGE 
209, 7 (15 January 1958); BVerfG, NJW 1962, 2243 (9 November 1962); BVerfG NJW 
1963, 147 (18 December 1962). 
16 BGHSt 19, 325 at 332 (21 February 1964). 
17 BVerfGE 44, 353 (24 May 1977). 
18 See: BGH NStZ 2008, 706; Rogal!, IZ 1996, 944, Godenzi, GA 2008, 500. 
19 For the traditional approach see: BVerfGE 57, 275 (predominant principle of 
German law); Spencer, in: Delmas Marty/Spencer (2002), pp. 25 et seq. as well as 
pp. 624 et seqq.; for a further analysis see: Gless, Beweisrechtsgrundsatze einer grenz-
iiberschreitenden Strafverfolgung, pp. 84-89; Weigend, Harv.J.L. Pub.Pol'y 2003, 157 at 
159. 
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German criminal procedure:20 The duty for and the trust in the judge - and 
law enforcement agencies21 - to find the truth has been an essential feature 
for centuries. The duty to establish the truth is not absolute, however, or -
as the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) puts it in a famous dictum: "It is not 
a principle of criminal procedure to arrive at the truth at any cost."22 The 
duty to search out the truth, thus, has its limits, in particular as soon as 
human and constitutional rights of individuals are derogated. 23 The BGH 
justified the exclusion of evidence balancing constitutional principles: 
Although the task of solving and punishing crimes is extremely important, 
it must be stressed that the purpose thereof is not and cannot always be the 
predominant interest of a state. Rather such an important public interest 
has to fit the overall context of the broader more general interests. The 
provisions of the basic law express its corrective effect in the sphere of the 
existing laws, so also in criminal procedure law, which is understood as 
applied constitutional law.24 
In German law the decision to limit the pool of information available, 
i.e. to exclude evidence, is left to the professional judges of a court.25 This 
fact accounts for a special situation: By establishing the facts with the 
method of "free consideration of evidence" ("freie Beweiswiirdigung"), the 
professional judges26 must erase their knowledge gained from excluded 
evidence and therefore also reject proof that might support the reasons for 
the judgment. This dilemma brings about a strong risk to dilute the impact 
of exclusionary rules.27 
At large, however, the mission to establish truth in a criminal pro-
ceeding has been modified in recent years. Especially the practice of and 
eventually legal provisions for "plea bargaining" ("Absprachen") intro-
2° For further information on the "accusatorial" and "inquisitorial" model see 
Spencer, in: Delmas Marty/Spencer (2002), pp. 20-21. 
21 § 160 (2) StPO obliges the prosecution also to "ascertain not only incriminating 
but also exonerating circumstances, and shall ensure that such evidence is taken the loss 
of which is to be feared". 
22 BGHSt 14, 361, at 364-365 (14 June 1960), translated paraphrase of German 
original. 
23 "Keine Wahrheitserforschung um jeden Preis", BGHSt 14, 358 at 365 (14 June 
1960); Beulke, Strafprozessrecht, 9th ed., C.F. Muller Heidelberg 2006, marginal number 
454; Weigend, Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 2003, 157 at 162. 
24 BGHSt 19, 325 at 329-330 (21 February 1964), emphasis added and translated 
summary of German original; see also: BGHSt 38, 214 (27 February 1992). 
25 The non-admission of evidence is not a discretionary decision, but a question of 
applying the law, which may be challenged with an appeal to a higher court. 
26 The situation is different for lay judges ("Sch6ffen") who sit in judgement on 
special cases of severe criminality and have no knowledge of investigation files. 
27 Frase/Weigend, B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1995, 317, 323 at 334. 
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duced a paradigm shift with regard to the traditional assignment of a court 
to find out the true facts of a case. 
2. General Rules of Admissibility/Exclusion of Illegally Gathered 
Evidence in High Court Jurisprudence 
a) Statutory Exclusionary Rules 
As already explained, jurisprudence distinguishes between the exclusion of 
evidence, because a statute expressly states so (statutory exclusionary 
rules, see supra I.1.a), and the judges' non-consideration of evidence, be-
cause it is gained by a breach of rule which is sufficiently grave to justify 
this exclusion (non-standardised exclusionary rules, see supra I.1.a). 
It had taken the German legislator roughly 50 years after Beling's 
famous lecture before the first statutory exclusionary rule banning illegally 
gathered evidence was introduced. § 136a StPO requires a court to exclude 
coerced confessions. The statute, which will be discussed below,28 ex-
pressly forbids the use of statements obtained in questionings of suspects 
or witnesses by improper methods such as ill-treatment, fatigue, physical 
violence, forced drugs application, deception, hypnosis, unlawful threats 
and the use of measures which interfere with the accused's memory or 
his/her ability to understand. The provision is seen as a tribute to Article 1 
of the Constitution, which protects human dignity and signals a renuncia-
tion of the law enforcement common during the Nazi regime.29 
The application of such statutory exclusionary rules appears to be rather 
easy at first view. However, numerous questions regarding the scope of the 
provisions have to be considered, for example, it has to be discussed how 
tainted derivative evidence should be handled. 
b) Non-Standardised Exclusionary Rules: Exclusionary Rules because of 
Grave Breach 
Apart from an explicit statutory rule, irregularities during the collection of 
evidence or other encroachments may trigger a ban of evidence. In general, 
the infringement of a right or the breach of a statute which is too important 
to ignore brings about the non-admission of information. Since no statute 
deals with this kind of non-standardised exclusionary rules (because of 
grave breach etc.), courts and academia have developed various ap-
proaches to guide such exclusion. 30 Two disparate concepts of exclusion 
28 See infra III.2.b) and c). 
29 BGHSt 1, 387 (30 October 1951). 
30 BGHSt 42, 170 at 172 (21 May 1996); BGHSt 47, 172 at 179 (22 November 2001); 
for a critical analysis see: Roxin, StV 2007, 450 at 452; see also: BVerfG NVwZ 2005, 
1175 (30 June 2005): "Aus dem Prozessgrundrecht auf ein faires, rechtsstaatliches Ver-
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are relevant in prevailing case law: 31 (1) a doctrine of "clean hands'', which 
relates to the "rule of law" in criminal proceedings and basically focuses 
on the illegal gathering of evidence - according to this doctrine the viola-
tion of a rule in order to safeguard the defendant's basic procedural rights 
leads to the exclusion of evidence (see infra aa); (2) a constitutional 
approach basically protecting the right of privacy so that any infringement 
of the sacrosanct private sphere leads to an exclusion of evidence (see 
infra bb). 
aa) Theory: Exclusion due to illegal gathering of evidence 
Without a statutory exclusionary rule it is always difficult to decide 
whether the violation of a rule for gathering of evidence triggers an exclu-
sionary rule, i.e. brings about the ban of the evidence collected. In Ger-
many, three predominant theories about exclusionary rules have to be con-
sidered in this context: 
(1) The "balancing approach" ("Abwagungstheorie"): a doctrine ap-
plied by courts and supported by some academics.32 Whenever procedural 
rules are violated by law enforcement agencies, the courts, in determining 
the truth, weigh the seriousness of the violation against the public interest 
as well as against the legal interests of the injured party.33 Illegally ob-
tained evidence shall be excluded only, if the interests of law enforcement 
cannot outweigh those of the defendant, i.e. if the severity of the offence 
investigated significantly outweighs the seriousness of the violation.34 Cir-
cumstances considered include the severity of police misconduct, the 
importance of the violated legal interest, the seriousness of the crime 
committed by the defendant and the relevance of the piece of evidence for 
the resolution of the case. Although jurisprudence has refused to establish 
strict rules on the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence so far, it empha-
sizes that the violation of a rule securing the defendant's basic procedural 
rights normally leads to the exclusion of the evidence obtained. Thus, 
according to case law, if, for example, the suspect is not informed of 
his/her right to "respond to the accusation, or not to make any statements 
on the charges and, even prior to his/her examination, to consult with a 
fahren ergibt sich nicht, dass die Verwertung fehlerhaft gewonnener Beweise stets unzu-
Iassig ist". 
31 There are, however, many other theories and approaches that justify the exclusion 
of evidence. 
32 BGHSt 42, 170 at 172, 179 (21 May 1996); for a critical view see: Grunwald, 
Beweisrecht der Strafprozessordnung, p. 143. 
33 See e.g. BGHSt 47, 172 at 179-180 (22 November 2001); BGH NJW 2003, 2034. 
34 For a comparison with US Law see: Thaman, St. Louis U.L. Rev. 2001, 581 at 608, 
Fn. 166. 
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defense counsel of his/her choice", this default leads to an exclusion of any 
statement the suspect makes during this interrogation35 - only if the ac-
cused knew about his/her right, but made a statement nevertheless, it may 
be admitted given the circumstances. 
(2) The "theory of protective purpose" ("Schutzzwecktheorie"): in its 
pure version it refuses to balance the competing interests of state and 
defendant, and instead advocates a uniform framework for exclusionary 
rules. 36 This theory maintains that, since a balance has already been made 
in the legislation of the violated legal norm, the courts are not allowed to 
balance again, but must exclude evidence obtained against the legal rule. 
Today the doctrine, however, is diluted due to many modifications. 
(3) The "theory of the rights to information control" ("Lehre von den 
Informationsbeherrschungsrechten"): this theory developed in academia 
focuses on the protection of the right to privacy, to secrecy and the protec-
tion of this private secrecy in public. 37 A defendant being the victim of 
illegal police misconduct whose rights to retain information concerning 
him- or herself are thus violated may request the exclusion or removal of 
illegally obtained evidence.38 
Despite their differences all three theories agree that the primary tasks 
of exclusionary rules in Germany - in contrast to the US doctrine - are not 
to have a disciplinary effect on law enforcement authorities. 
Jurisprudence often works with a combination of elements from both, 
the balancing approach as well as with some variations of the theory of 
protective purpose.39 
bb) Theory: Exclusion because of the protection of privacy 
A doctrine not predominantly focusing on the issue of illegally collected 
evidence is the approach of German High Courts which aims to protect the 
privacy of individuals involved in a criminal proceeding, i.e. suspects. 
Basically it differentiates three spheres with regard to information gather-
ing. According to the "three-sphere-approach" ("Drei-Spharentheorie")40 
law enforcement agencies may gather information about a person and his/ 
her private life 
35 BGHSt 38, 372 (29 October 1992). 
36 See Grunwald (supra note 32), p. 155; Rudolphi, MDR 1970, 93 at 97. 
37 Amelung, Informationsbeherrschungsrechte im Strafprozess (1990), pp. 24 and 30. 
38 Amelung (supra note 3 7), p. 52. 
39 BGHSt 46, 189 at 195 (3 November 2000). 
40 BVerfGE 34, 238 at 245-247 (31 January 1973); BVerfGE 109, 279 (3 March 
2004) (electronic tapping of private residences, "groJ3er Lauschangriff'). 
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(1) in a public social context, where e.g. photographs may be taken and 
visual recordings made, movements observed, speeches in front of an 
audience like a business club etc. be recorded - such material may be 
used as evidence;41 whereas information gathered secretly without 
meeting the legal requirements may most probably not be used;42 
(2) in a private context, however exposed in public - e.g. an overheard 
private conversation in a restaurant - such information may only be 
used if law enforcement interests outweigh privacy interests, taking 
into account the severity of the accusation, the prominence of the pri-
vacy right, the relevance of the evidence etc;43 
(3) in the sacrosanct private sphere, e.g. a diary entry never meant for other 
eyes or a soliloquy uttered in a hospital room - such strictly off the 
record information may not be seized nor used as evidence in a crimi-
nal proceeding,44 since it violates the human dignity.45 
Although the "three-sphere-approach" has been criticized from the begin-
ning, 46 it is still a relevant evaluation guideline today.47 
c) Restrictions on the Enforcement of Exclusionary Rules 
In spite of the development towards a rather broad application of inadmis-
sibility principles, German jurisprudence introduced three important re-
strictions on the enforcement of exclusionary rules. 
aa) Violation of the Legally Protected Sphere - "Rechtskreistheorie" 
According to established case law a person may only challenge the admis-
sibility of illegally obtained evidence, if the violated rule on evidence 
gathering protects his or her acknowledged interests and thus forms part of 
his or her legally protected rights ("Rechtskreistheorie"). This approach 
41 Beulke (supra note 23), marginal number 471. 
42 BGHSt 31, 304 (17 March 1983); BGHSt 31, 309 (6 April 1983); BGHSt 32, 68 at 
70 (24 August 1983); Beulke (supra note 23), marginal number 471. 
43 See BGH JR 1994, 430; see also "Abwagungslehre" supra I.2.b)aa). 
44 See e.g. BVerfGE 80, 367 (14 September 1990) (Diary Case of 1990); BVerfG 
109, 279 at 281 (3 March 2004) (electronic bugging of homes); BGHSt 50, 206 (10 Au-
gust 2005), BGH NStZ 2005, 700 (Hospital Room Case); Baldus, JZ 2008, 218 at 219; 
Baum/Schantz, ZRP 2008, 137. 
45 As protected by article 1 (1) GG, see BVerfGE 109, 279 (3 March 2004) as well as 
BVerfGE 80, 367 (14 September 1990) (Diary Case of 1990); BGH NStZ 2005, 700 
(Hospital Room Case); Jahn, NStZ 2004, 383 at 384. 
46 See e.g. Wolter, NStZ 1993, 1; Lindemann, JR 2006, 191. 
47 See BGHSt 33, 217 (9 May 1985) and§ lOOf StPO as an example of corresponding 
legislation; furthermore: Hohmann-Dennhardt, NJW 2006, 545; Beulke (supra note 23), 
marginal number 4 71. 
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creates a general obstacle with regard to the enforcement of an exclu-
sionary rule according to which illegally obtained evidence in a criminal 
proceeding is banned. The Federal Court of Justice introduced it first when 
deciding on evidence exclusion in a case where the privilege to refuse to 
give evidence was violated in so far as the police had disregarded a wit-
ness' privilege against self-incrimination.48 The witness' statement was 
evaluated to be admissible - although to the defendant's disadvantage -, 
because the violation had not infringed upon the defendant's legally pro-
tected rights. 
bb) Veto against the Admission of Evidence - "Widerspruchslosung" 
Only recently the German courts introduced another requirement for the 
exclusion of evidence: Only if the person whose rights have been violated 
during the gathering of evidence explicitly vetoes the admission of the 
illegally obtained evidence in time, the exclusionary rule will be en-
forced.49 If, for example, a defendant is not cautioned properly, she or her 
defence counsel must oppose the use of such evidence as soon as possible, 
otherwise the claim is lost. This "Widerspruchsl6sung" is heavily criti-
cized by various scholars. 50 
cc) Hypothetical clean path 
In some cases courts apply the "hypothetical clean path" analysis ("hypo-
thetischer Ermittlungsverlauf') to justify the admission of evidence di-
rectly obtained by illegal means. The courts argue that relevant evidence 
should not be excluded because of a mere "technical fault", if otherwise 
the evidence could have been obtained by legal means. 51 
For example, in the case of an illegal, i.e. unauthorised, search of the 
suspect's apartment the BGH argued that the evidence found in the apart-
ment should not be excluded, since under different circumstances a judicial 
authorisation could have been granted and thus would have turned the 
seized objects into admissible evidence. 
48 BGHSt 11, 213 (21 January 1958); see also: BGHSt 38, 214 at 220 (27 February 
1992). 
49 BGHSt 38, 214 at 225 (27 February 1992); BGHSt 39, 349 at 352 (12 October 
1993); BGH NStZ 1997, 502; BGH JR 2005, 385, 386, in favour: Basdorf, StV 1997 491; 
Hamm, NJW 1996, 2185 at 2188. "Widerspruchsl6sung" does not apply in cases of 
§ 136a StPO, see BGH StV 1996, 360. 
50 See LIR-Gless, Kommentar zur StPO, § 136 nos. 82-84; Grunwald (supra 
note 32), p. 149 et seq.; Wohlers, NStZ 1995, 45 at 46. 
51 BGHSt 24, 125 (17 March 1971); BGH NStZ 1989, 375 (15 February 1989); 
Roxin, NStZ 1989, 376 et seqq.; Meurer, JR 1990, 388 et seqq.; for a comparative per-
spective see: Thaman, St. Louis U.L. Rev 2001, 581at611-12. 
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In another case, the Federal Court of Justice, although confronted with . 
the fact that a car is reckoned to belong to the protected private sphere, still 
considered admissible the tape of a "live" conversation in a suspect's car 
which was accidentally recorded on a tape that was meant to record tele-
phone conversations on the suspect's cell phone only. The court argued 
that the installation of a hidden microphone in the suspect's car could have 
been granted legally on the basis of another provision of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. According to its view the use of the wrong legal 
statute alone was no reason to exclude the evidence. 
In a case decided more recently by the Higher Regional Court of Celle I 
Lower Saxony (Oberlandesgericht, OLG), a police officer acquired a blood 
sample of a suspect from a nurse after the suspect had undergone emer-
gency surgery. Despite the fact that the police officer had acted illegally, 
the court admitted the blood sample, arguing that it would be formalistic to 
exclude it, since the officer could have obtained another blood sample by 
immediately ordering a physical examination of the suspect in accordance 
with§ 8la StP0.52 
Although the "hypothetical clean path" -approach has been criticized 
from the beginning, it is still predominant53 in case law. 54 
3. Effect of International Human Rights Jurisprudence 
After a period of reluctance the German Courts have over the years 
(finally) acknowledged the requirements of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (hereinafter: Convention) and its impact on or rather 
primacy over the German criminal justice systems. Meanwhile German 
jurisprudence has absorbed several concepts introduced by the European 
Court of Human Rights, especially the test of a "fair trial" which guaran-
tees an examination whether proceedings have been fair in an "overall 
approach". 55 
52 OLG Celle NStZ 1989 (14 March 1989). If, however, the police deliberately 
circumvents legal proceedings, the evidence will be excluded, see OLG Dresden NJW 
2009, 2149 (11 May 2009). 
53 In some cases the Federal Court of Justice refrained from applying a "hypothetical 
clean path doctrine", see BGHSt 25, 168 (28 March 1973). 
54 BGH NJW 2003, 2034, for a critical analysis see: Rogal!, NStZ 1988, 385; 
Wess/au, StV 2003, 483; Jahn/Dallmeyer, NStZ 2005, 297 at 304. 
55 For further information see Gaede, Fairness als Teilhabe - Das Recht aufkonkrete 
und wirksame Verteidigung gema/3 Art. 6 EMRK, Duncker & Humblot Berlin 2007; 
Simon, Die Beschuldigtenrechte nach Art. 6 Abs. 3 EMRK, Kohler-Druck Tubingen 
1998. 
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II. Rules of Admissibility/Exclusion in Relation to Violations 
of the Right to Privacy 
1. General Provisions Protecting the Right to Privacy and Personality 
Development 
German law does not provide an explicit provision protecting the right to 
privacy. But after the Second World War German courts have - after the 
experience of a totalitarian regime - invented a manifold privacy approach. 
This approach is chiefly based on constitutional provisions, in particular 
Article 2 (1) GG which grants the "right to free development of [one's] 
personality". 
In 1954, roughly fifty years after Beling's lecture on the exclusion of 
certain evidence, the Federal Court of Justice, for the first time, embarked 
on a new doctrine for exclusionary rules that pronounces against the use of 
a polygraph, declaring it an infringement of an individual's personality. In 
the sixties, two landmark decisions were set with the Recording Tape Case 
(Tonbandentscheidung)56 and the First Diary Case (Erste Tagebuchent-
scheidung),57 and thus the concept of excluding evidence primarily for pri-
vacy reasons got introduced. Before these precedents, the courts had re-
frained from the suppression of illegally obtained, but reliable evidence. 
Especially High Courts deducted from a synopsis of these provisions 
several constitutional rights of personality, among them the individual's 
right to the spoken word. 58 
Different from US case law German jurisprudence grants suspects 
privacy rights not only in private locations, but also in public. The issue of 
privacy is not attached to location alone, but to the private nature of the 
information. 59 It is an aspect of the right to personality and human dignity, 
which includes the right to "informational self-determination'', rather than 
to the expectation "to be left alone". 60 In the Hospital Room Case, for ex-
ample, a murder suspect was admitted to a rehabilitation hospital, where 
police bugged his room by leave of the competent authorities. Talking to 
himself he muttered: " ... very aggressive! I should have shot him in his 
56 BGHSt 14, 358 (14 June 1960), (Recording Tape Case). 
57 BGHSt 19, 325 (21February1964), (First Diary Case). 
58 See also right to privacy of correspondenc~, posts and telecommunications as 
protected by Art. 10 Basic Law. 
59 For a comparative perspective see Ross, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court 
and the Regulation of GPS surveillance, German Law Journal, Vol. 6 No. 12 (1 De-
cember 2005). 
60 See BVerfGE 65, 1 (15 December 1983); Amelung, NJW 1990, 1755; Kutscha, 
NJW 2007, 1169. 
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head ... " The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) excluded the evidence, since 
it detected an infringement of the suspect's private sphere. 61 
a) Constitutional Provisions 
The German constitution guarantees in its Article 2 (1) GG the "right to 
the free development of personality" as long as a person does not violate 
the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral 
code. The· right of free self-determination of personality is acknowledged 
as a basic value of the German legal order which, as a consequence, pro-
tects the (sacrosanct) private sphere from investigations by law enforce-
ment agencies. 
Various other constitutional provisions protect the right to privacy, too. 
For example, Article 13 GG guarantees the sanctity of the home, Article 10 
secures the secrecy of the post and phone, thus protecting the individual's 
right to be left alone; and Article 104 GG ensures the right of free move-
ment. 62 
b) Statutory Provisions 
There is no explicit statute in the StPO protecting the "right to privacy" as 
such. However, the StPO retains the right to privacy in various provisions 
safeguarding traditional civil rights and liberties, partly confirming con-
stitutional rights and regulating special situations differently. The right of 
free movement, for example, which is also guaranteed in Article 104 GG, 
is implicitly secured in§§ 112-13 StPO. 
Many statutory provisions relate to privacy, among them various ones 
related to the right to the own spoken word. For example, § 477 (2) 2 StPO 
covers the use of chance finds that arise from telephone tapping ("Zufalls-
funde bei Telefoniiberwachungen"), § lOOc (5) 3 StPO handles records of 
intimate communication during electronic eavesdropping operations in 
private residences ("Intimaufzeichnungen beim groJ3en Lauschangriff'), 
§ lOOd (5) 1 StPO deals with chance finds during electronic bugging 
operations of private residences ("Zufallsfunde beim groJ3en Lauschan-
griff') or § 1 OOh (2) 2 StPO deal with recordings of private conversations 
in public ("Zufallsfunde beim Einsatz technischer Hilfsmittel und beim 
kleinen Lauschangriff'). 
61 For example: BGH NStZ 2005, 700 (Hospital Room Case). 
62 See e.g. BVerfGE 32, 54 (13 October 1971). 
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c) The Federal Court of Justice Interprets the Constitutions/Basic Law 
Quite early German courts focused on the right to privacy in their judg-
ments: 
Prominent for the exclusion of evidence in order to protect privacy is 
the Federal Court of Justice's First Diary Case of 1964.63 This judgment 
did not only focus on privacy rights, but prepared the ground for a new 
important doctrine. It had to decide whether the defendant's diary was 
admissible as evidence in a perjury trial. The defendant was called to be a 
witness in the adultery trial of her former lover. She denied any involve-
ment with him. The wife of another former lover of the defendant found 
the defendant's diary in her home and handed it over to the police. The 
trial court admitted the diary as evidence and convicted the defendant for 
perjury. Though, the BGH reversed the defendant's conviction on the 
ground that the use of the defendant's private diary against her in court 
decisively violated her "right of free self-determination of personality" 
under Articles 1 and 2 of the GG. 64 Even before this diary decision, the 
BGH considered the admissibility of privately recorded tapes in a criminal 
case, in the so-called 1960 Recording Tape Case.65 The defendant, an 
attorney of a rape victim, proceeded with negotiations with a female friend 
of the rape offender in the phase of the trial. The female friend secretly 
tape-recorded the conversation between herself and the attorney who was 
accused of attempting to press his client to perjure herself. The Federal 
Court of Justice eventually excluded the tape on the basis that tape-re-
cording of words without the speaker's consent violates his sphere of per-
sonality and right to his words - as a consequence the defendant was 
acquitted. 66 The court not only confirmed the theory subsequently, but also 
refined the concept. 
It was, however, the Federal Constitutional Court that - instead of an 
interpretation - elaborated the right to privacy further; in so far as it pro-
tects individual autonomy and "informational self-determination" as 
aspects of privacy and dignity. 67 In the census case68 it stresses that it is "a 
right of every citizen to know what information the government has col-
lected about him and to limit the government's use, storage, and transmis-
63 BGHSt 19, 325 (21 February 1964), (First Diary Case). 
64 BGHSt 19, 32, at 326-327 (21 February 1964); BGHSt 19, 329 at 330 (21 Feb-
ruary 1964) (emphasis added). 
65 BGHSt 14, 358 (14 June 1960), (Recording Tape Case). 
66 BGHSt 14, 358 at 359 (14 June 1960). 
67 BVerfGE 65, 1 (15 December 1983); for further information see: Ross, German 
Law Journal, Vol. 6 No. 12 (1December2005). 
68 BVerfGE 65, 1 (15 December 1983) ("Volkszahlungsurteil"). 
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sion of the data."69 More recently the court has developed this reasoning 
further in the GPS case and argues that - given the progress in surveillance 
technology - the German piecemeal regulation on secret information gath-
ering eventually will not be able to protect privacy as established by case 
law. One reason for this failure is the fact that rules on information gath-
ering only cover one law enforcement tool at a time, but never the whole 
picture that might, for instance, include a combination of telephone tap-
ping, data mining in financial matters, GPS surveillance etc.70 
2. Protection of Privacy in Private Residences and Other Private 
Buildings 
a) Constitutional Provisions 
Naturally, in their homes (including any accommodation), people are en-
titled to privacy and enjoy the sanctity of the home. Article 13 declares 
that "(1) The home is inviolable. (2) Searches may be authorized only by a 
judge or, when time is of the essence, by other authorities designated by 
the laws, and may be carried out only in the manner therein prescribed." 
Intimate information uttered inside one's home belongs to the taboo of 
the private sphere immune to any government interference;71 however, 
other information gained by tapping in a legally implemented investigation 
maybe used. 
b) Statutory Provisions 
Following-up Article 13 GG several provisions of the StPO establish a 
system of exceptions in order to gather information in peoples' homes: 
According to §§ 102, 105 StPO, a judge may order a search of a defen-
dant's private and other premises if an offense is "suspected[ ... and] it may 
be presumed that the search will lead to the discovery of evidence". How-
ever, in a "danger in delay" situation, also the prosecutor and its auxiliary 
police officials are authorised to order such searches according to §§ 98, 
105 StPO. A "danger in delay" exists whenever the delay involved in ac-
quiring a judicial warrant endangers the success of the search, because the 
object in question could be destroyed or concealed.72 In 1998 the parlia-
ment introduced the law that allows electronic tapping of private resi-
dences (groBer Lauschangriff) in cases of severe crimes. In doing so it was 
- inevitably - faced with records of intimate communication. As a conse-
quence of the judicial doctrine on protection of privacy, § lOOc (5) 3 StPO 
69 BVerfGE 65, 1 (15 December 1983). 
70 BVerfGE 112, 304 (12 April 2005). 
71 See exclusionary rule in § 1 OOc StPO. 
72 See Frase!Weigend, B.C. Int'! & Comp. L Rev. 1995, 317, 323 at 332. 
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rules that such tapping has to be stopped as soon as statements belonging 
to the core area of privacy are recorded. Accidental recordings of such 
material have to be deleted immediately and potential insight gained from 
such recordings in the meantime must not be used as evidence. 
c) High Court Jurisprudence Interpreting Effect of Violations of Above 
Provisions on Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence 
German case law considering admissibility of information gathered in a 
suspect's home deplores both, the law enforcement agents' adherence to 
criminal procedure rules on evidence gathering and the legitimacy and 
legality of surveillance or rather secret surveillance in a private sphere. For 
example, German courts had to decide whether information gathered by 
law enforcement agencies by means of bugging operations inside an 
apartment may still be used as evidence when originally only an operation 
outside the home had been allowed for. The Federal Court of Justice 
(BGH) excluded this type of evidence.73 
However, in another case in which the legal restrictions on the length of 
electronic eavesdropping was neglected by the law enforcement agencies, 
the court admitted the seized information as evidence nevertheless. 74 These 
few examples show that the exclusionary rules which protect privacy still 
lack a doctrine that makes the outcome of such particular cases more pre-
dictable. 
d) Admissibility of Indirect Evidence (Fruits of the Poisonous Tree) 
According to case law and the predominant view in literature the inadmis-
sibility of illegally obtained evidence does not extend to derivative evi-
dence.75 Jurisprudence and a majority of scholars76 do not acknowledge a 
fruit of the poisonous "tree doctrine". Therefore the Federal Court of Jus-
tice, for example, regarded the following material admissible as evidence: 
statements by witnesses obtained by means of an illegal wiretap77 and even 
an entrapment78 or a confession by the defendant to an expert witness a 
few days after he had been confronted with an illegally recorded tape 
73 BGHSt 42, 372 at 377 (15 January 1997). 
74 BGHSt 44, 243 at 248 (11 November 1998) (Verletzung der Dreimonatsfrist); 
Wolters, JR 1999, 524. 
75 See e.g. BGHSt 29, 244 at 247 (18 April 1980); BGHSt 32, 68 (24 August 1983); 
BGHSt 34, 362 (28 April 1987); BGHSt 35, 32 (6 August 1987). 
76 However there are strong voices of critique, see e.g. Roxin/Achenbach, Strafpro-
zessrecht 16'h ed., C.H. Beck Mtinchen 2006, § 24 marginal number 47; Otto, GA 1970, 
289 at 284. 
77 BGHSt 32, 68 (24 August 1983). 
78 BGHSt 34, 362 (28 April 1987). 
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revealing his self-incriminating remarks. 79 Thus, the fruits of illegal 
searches are usually also reckoned to be admissible. 80 
However, in one instance the Federal Court of Justice excluded deriva-
tive evidence gained by violating provisions on telephone tapping. 81 In this 
particular case the court argued that the police had disregarded statutory 
requirements according to which this kind of licit infringement of privacy 
- in this particular case of the freedom of press - tainted the indirect evi-
dence. 
A majority group of academics, however, is of the opinion that at least 
in case of default to advise the accused of his/her rights, as required by 
§ 136 StPO, must always lead to the .exclusion of leads gathered on the 
basis of inadmissible statements. 82 
However, even if information may not be used as evidence, case law 
still allows the use as lead ("Spurenailsatz"). 83 Thus - critics say - even 
tainted evidence may turn into untainted evidence. 84 
The rejection of any "fruit of the poisonous tree-doctrine" and instead 
the acceptance of the "hypothetical clean path"85 is probably best ex-
plained by the fact that in Germany evidence is not excluded in order to 
deter police misconduct, but basically on a "clean hands" rationale. 86 Indi-
rect evidence itself is not tainted by the violation of procedural rules so 
that the interests of justice outweigh any remaining reservations with 
regard to possible defects in the process of seizure. 
III. Rules of Admissibility/Exclusion in Relation to 
Illegal Interrogations 
Broadly speaking German law does not know an incidence such as "illegal 
interrogation", which most probably taints all, even subsequently gathered 
evidence. Compared with the English PACE or the US law on exclusionary 
rules, the German StPO has a less detailed system when it comes to the 
regulations with regard to the limits of investigative power by the police, 
the safeguard of the individual's procedural rights in each step of the in-
79 BGHSt 35, 32 (6 August 1987). 
80 BVerfGE 2 BvR 2225/08 (2 July 2009); BGHSt 27, 355 at 358 (22 February 1978); 
BGHSt 32, 68 at 71 (24 August 1983). 
81 BGHSt 29, 244 at 247 (18 April 1980) "Spiegel case". 
82 LIR-Gless, § 136 no. 107; Roxin/Achenbach (supra note 76), § 24 marginal number 
47; Grunwald, JZ 1966, 489. 
83 See BGHSt 27, 355 at 358 (22 February 1978). 
84 See Beulke (supra note 23), marginal number 476. 
85 See supra II.2.c)cc). 
86 See Weigend, in: Craig. M. Bradley (supra note 3), 243 at 253. 
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vestigation, and the sanctions against police misconduct. Particularly, the 
guarantee for procedural rights in pre-trial interrogation is treated less 
extensively. However, § 136 StPO and § 136 a StPO cover illegal interro-
gation techniques and the consequences for evidence collected by such 
means. 
I. The General Right to Remain Silent/Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination 
a) Constitutional Provisions 
No constitutional provision does explicitly grant the right to remain silent. 
However, emphasising human dignity as a basic value of the German legal 
system and a principle of criminal procedure based on the rule of law, the 
German Federal Court of Justice stated in a famous obiter dictum: 87 
"The instructions [of§ 136 (1) and 136 a StPO] are not isolated rules for their own sake, 
but rather they express the constitutional stance of the criminal procedure that does not 
permit degrading proceedings against the defendant ... Under the same circumstances it 
must not be allowed that the defendant's utterances illegally obtained by tape recordings 
can be used against him/her. .. This interpretation entails that important or even the only 
evidence available in order to solve a crime has to be discarded. However, this dilemma 
has to be accepted. Besides, it is not a principle of criminal procedure to arrive at the 
truth at any cost. "88 
b) Statutory Provisions 
The defendant's right to silence derives from the nemo tenetur-principle 
introduced by the Code Napoleon.89 However, this principle is not explic-
itly stated in a special provision of a German Code, but acknowledged as a 
basic maxim in order to protect an individual from being forced to accuse 
him-/herself. 90 
c) High Court interpretation of scope, protected interests, etc. covered by 
general right 
In addition to the exclusion of evidence on the grounds that a provision got 
violated, case law has attached manifold other implications to nemo tene-
87 BGHSt 14, 358 at 361 (14 June 1960). 
88 BGHSt 14, 358 at 361, at 364-365 (14 June 1960). 
89 See.!. Spencer, in: Delmas Marty/Spencer (2002), pp. 610-611. 
90 Vgl. etwa BVerfGE 38, 105 at 113 (8 October 1974); BVerfGE 56, 37 at 43 
(13 January 1981); BGHSt 37, 340 at 343 (19 March 1991); BGHSt 38, 214 at 220 
(27 February 1992) and BGHSt 38, 302 at 305 (26 May 1992); SK/Rogall, Vor § 133, 73, 
130 et seqq.; Bosch, Aspekte des nemo tenetur-Grundsatzes aus verfassungsrechtlicher 
und strafprozessualer Sicht (1998), 24 et seqq. 
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tur: 91 Each accused has the right to refuse to answer questions and may not 
be punished for exercising this right in any way. 92 According to the nemo 
tenetur-principle the court must not regard or treat silence as an inferior 
strategy of defence. 93 As a consequence an accused who remains silent in 
all respects and during the whole trial must not be regarded as worse off 
compared to the one who testifies.94 The silent defendant, however, risks 
paying a (high) price, since confessions might lead to a mitigation of 
punishment. 95 
2. The Protection Against Involuntary Self-Incrimination: 
Torture, Coercion, Threats, Promises, etc. 
a) Constitutional Provisions 
The German constitution does not contain an explicit provision banning 
torture or comparable mistreatment. However, according to Article 1 GG 
"Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the 
duty of all state authority.", and thus it condemns any kind of ill-treatment. 
Article 104 (1) GG states with regard to the rights of persons in detention: 
"Persons in custody may not be subjected to mental or physical mistreat-
ment." 
The decision of the Federal Court of Justice in the Tape Recording case 
illustrates post-war reasoning when it stresses that the instructions of 
§ 136a StPO are not isolated rules, but have to be seen in the constitutional 
context of the criminal procedure based on the rule of law that protects the 
human dignity. 96 
Nevertheless, the Gafgen Case in Germany, at the beginning of this 
millennium, launched a discussion about the legitimacy of "torture for res-
91 See Grunwald JZ 1981, 428; Rogal! NStZ 1998, 67 et seq.; Wej3lau StV 1997, 343 
on the one hand, and Hackethal, Der Einsatz von Vomitivmitteln zur Beweissicherung im 
Strafverfahren (2005), 137; Neumann, FS E.A. Wolff, 376; Verrel, Die Selbstbelastungs-
freiheit im Strafverfahren (2001), 223 on the other hand. 
92 BGHSt 38, 214 at 218 (27 February 1992); Beulke (supra note 23), marginal 
number 467; Bose, GA 2002, 99 et seqq.; Wej3lau, ZStW 110 (1998), l et seqq. 
93 Tarka, Nachtatverhalten und Nemo tenetur (2000), p. 74; Bose, GA 2002, 119. 
94 BGHSt 32, 140 at 144 (26 October 1983); BGH StV 1989, 90; Miebach, NStZ 
2000,235. 
95 See Bosch (supra note 90), 197 et seqq.; Honig, Die strafmildemden Wirkung 
eines Gestandnisses im Lichte der Strafzwecke (2004), 78 et seqq. Insofar one could 
claim, that it is possible in Germany that from the accused's silence a legal inference of 
guilt is drawn. Because a court may use a stubborn denial by the accused as evidence of 
the fact that the accused is lacking in remorse and may justify imposing a more severe 
sentence. 
96 BGHSt 14, 358, at 365 (14 June 1960). 
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cue" ("Rettungsfolter"). 97 Gafgen had abducted a boy and killed him. 
Subsequently he deposited a letter at the parents' place asking for money. 
The police secretly observed him picking up the ransom and arrested him. 
Not reckoning the victim to be dead already, the police officers dutifully 
informed the defendant that he was suspected of being a kidnapper, that he 
had the right to remain silent and that he may consult a lawyer. The fol-
lowing interrogation was conducted with a view to find out about the boy's 
whereabouts, but this undertaking was of no avail. The next day a police 
officer - attending the deputy chief's orders - threatened the defendant to 
provoke a considerably painful treatment (by a specially trained person) by 
not disclosing the child's fate, whereupon the defendant revealed the truth. 
The police found the corpse. In subsequent interviews the defendant reiter-
ated his confession. Furthermore the police confirmed that the defendant 
had left other tracks, e.g. DNA traces on the ransom and corpse. After 
lower courts decided to admit this indirect evidence, the Constitutional 
Court - in answer to a constitutional complaint - turned down this (con-
stitutional) complaint that also included the applicant's complains referring 
to the refusal by the Regional Court to exclude the use of all evidence 
obtained as a result of the confession extorted from him by threats. 98 
b) Statutory Provisions 
§ 136a StPO explicitly prohibits confessions obtained by improper meas-
ures which impair the capability to decide freely whether to give evidence 
or not: 
"(1) The accused's freedom to make up his/her mind and to manifest his/her will shall 
not be impaired by ill-treatment, induced fatigue, physical interference, forced admini-
stration of drugs, deception or hypnosis. Coercion may be used only as far as this is per-
mitted by criminal procedure law. Threatening the accused with measures not permitted 
under its provisions or holding out the prospect of an advantage not envisaged by statute 
shall be prohibited. 
(2) Measures which impair the accused's memory or his/her ability to understand shall 
not be permitted. 
(3) The prohibition under subsections (1) and (2) shall apply irrespective of the ac-
cused's consent [to the proposed measure]. Statements which were obtained in breach of 
this prohibition shall not be used [as evidence], even ifthe accused agrees to their use." 
97 Hamm, NJW 2003 946; Hecker, KI 2003 210; Jerouscheck!Kolbel, IZ 2003 613; 
Kinzig, ZStW 115 (2004) 799 et seq.; Saliger, ZStW 116 (2004) 48 et seq.: Hilgendorf, 
IZ 2004 331 et seqq. 
98 BVerfGE NJW 2005, 656. The applicant had failed to raise this issue in the pro-
ceedings before the Federal Court of Justice. 
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c) High Court Jurisprudence Interpreting Effect of Violations of Above 
Provisions on Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence or Articulating 
Them in Case Law 
Case law discusses extensively the question under which circumstances a 
confession or rather a statement must be excluded according to § 136a 
StPO which prohibits improper interrogation methods. The answer is based 
on a doctrine that regards any interrogation techniques which improperly 
affect the suspect's free will as illegal. For instance, fatigue must be 
avoided by granting any suspect sufficient sleep. However, if the suspect 
cannot find sleep because of restlessness, he/she may be questioned 
nevertheless.99 To give analeptics may qualify as (forced) drugs applica-
tion, whereas coffee may be served. 100 To administer emetics is prohibited 
according to § 136a StPO, even in cases in which drug dealers swallow 
drug packages during a police bust in order to suppress evidence. 101 We 
speak of illegal deception (and not a mere ruse) if the police tells a person 
bone-crushing evidence for prosecution is at hand, when, in fact, law en-
forcement agencies are in the dark. 102 To give a warning of arrest to a per-
son who refuses to cooperate is illegal, 103 if this threat with imprisonment 
is actually only meant to interfere with the person's refusal to corporate, as 
is the promise of exemption from punishment as soon as a suspect incrimi-
1. 104 nates an accomp ice. 
A breach of § 136a StPO brings about an absolute exclusion of evi-
dence, which is applied without any restrictions to all suspects involved in 
the case - may they have been subjected to coercion or not (e.g. as co-
defendants).105 
Cases of ill-treatment have led to controversial discussions lately in 
Germany in two situations: (a) refers to the admissibility of indirect evi-
dence obtained by illegal questioning (Gafgen case); (b) alludes to the ad-
missibility of evidence received from a third country where "rough inter-
99 BGH NStZ 1999, 630. 
100 BGHSt11, 211(4March1958). 
101 EGMR Urt. v. 11 July 2006 - 54810/00, NJW 2006, 3117 "Jalloh/Deutschland"; 
BVerfG StV 2000, 1; KG Berlin NStZ-RR 2001 204; Eisenberg, Beweisrecht, no. 1638. 
102 BGHSt 35, 328 (24 August 1988). 
103 BGH GA 1955, 246; StV 2005, 201; see also: BGH StV 1996, 76; Roxin/ 
Achenbach (supra note 76), § 25, 24. 
104 OLG Hamm StV 1984, 456. 
105 The Regional Court (9 April 2003), although dismissing the application for the 
criminal proceedings to be discontinued in a separate decision, held that the threat to 
cause the applicant pain had been illegal pursuant to § 13 6a StPO (and also pursuant to 
Article 1 and Article 104 (1) GG and Article 3 ECHR), and triggered exclusion of 
evidence; BGH bei Dallinger, MDR 1971 18; see furthermore: LG Stuttgart NStZ 1985 
569; Eisenberg, Beweisrecht, 712; but also: OLG Koln NJW 1979 1218. 
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rogation" (or rather torture) was - and still is - regarded a legal method to 
question a suspect (Motassadeq case ). 106 
The admissibility of evidence in the Gafgen case has been discussed 
above. 107 
The Motassadeq case has not been discussed as intensely by academics, 
although it raises important questions with regard to international law en-
forcement: May a court use statements which have been allegedly obtained 
under torture in a third country? Although German courts aclmowledge the 
exclusionary rule of Article 15 UN-Torture Convention in general (and 
would ban such (tainted) evidence consequently), 108 they take up a reluc-
tant stance on cases of (alleged) torture abroad and exclude coerced evi-
dence in this context only if inhuman ill-treatment during the interrogation 
(abroad) has actually been proven. 109 
d) Admissibility of Indirect Evidence (Fruits of the Poisonous Tree) 
Whether indirect evidence gained by forbidden treatment of a suspect is 
admissible is subject to a highly controversial discussion in Germany. 110 
Three positions can be distinguished: (1) Case law refers to the wording of 
§ 136a according to which the use of a coerced statement is prohibited; but 
otherwise the paragraph remains mute (about the rest).m Thus indirect 
evidence may be admitted, in particular if law enforcement agencies can 
get hold of the evidence by way of the "hypothetical clean path" .112 How-
ever, not all courts follow this doctrine. 113 (2) The opposite standpoint114 
asks for the adoption of a "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" which bans 
the use of indirect evidence, 115 in the hope such an approach may deter 
106 OLG Hamburg NJW 2005, 2326; Salditt, FS Hamm, p. 595. 
107 See supra III.2.a). 
108 BVerfGE EuGRZ 1996, 328; BVerfG NJW 2004, 1858; OLG Hamburg NJW 
2005, 2328; Schomburg/Lagodny!GleB/Hackner-Lagodny § 73 IRG, marginal number 
90a. 
109 OLG Hamburg NJW 2005, 2326 (14. June 2005); BGH NStZ 2004, 343 (4 March 
2004); BGH NStZ 2008, at 643-644. 
110 See L/R-Gless, § 136a, marginal number 75; Eisenberg, Beweisrecht, 714 et 
seqq.; Milssig, GA 1999 136 et seq. 
111 BGHSt 34, 362 (28 April 1987), considering the hypothetical clean path OLG 
Hamburg MDR 1976, 601; OLG Stuttgart NJW 1973, 1941. 
112 See supra I.2.c)cc). 
113 See for example, LG Hannover StV 1986, 522. 
114 Eisenberg, Beweisrecht, 714 et seqq.; Grilnwald (supra note 32), 158; Beulke, 
ZStW 103 (1991) 669. 
115 Aus U.S.Perspektive und rechtsvergleichender Sicht: Thaman, 45 St. Louis Law 
Journal 581 (2001); zur U.S. Doktrin see also Forbes, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 1221 (1987). 
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police from using illegal questioning techniques. 116 (3) A conciliating ap-
proach in jurisprudence and literature117 votes for a balancing approach in 
each particular case. 
In the Giifgen Case118 the question was whether the continuous effect of 
the threat of violence against the defendant as well as the finding of the 
corpse, which had become known to the investigation authorities because 
of the statements extracted from Magnus Giifgen ("the applicant"), tainted 
all further statements and made them inadmissible in the on-going criminal 
proceedings. The Frankfurt am Main/ Hesse Regional Court took the con-
ciliatory approach according to which, in the particular circumstances of 
the case, a balance of interests had to be carried out, taking into account, in 
particular, whether there had been a flagrant violation of the legal order, 
notably of provisions on fundamental rights, and also considering the seri-
ousness of the offence investigated. 119 Thus the Court admitted the state-
ments made at the later hearing, since the applicant had been instructed 
anew about his right as a defendant to remain silent and nevertheless had 
made again the same confessions. 
e) Effect of International Human Rights Jurisprudence 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: "No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment." Whether and when this provision triggers an exclusion of evi-
dence in German criminal proceedings has been discusses recently in the 
Gafgen Case. 120 Giifgen submitted his case to the ECHR, claiming "his 
right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, compris-
ing [among other] a right not to incriminate himself'. 121 
116 For a comparative view (from a German perspective) see: Harris, StV 1991 313; 
Salditt, GA 1992 59; zur Beriicksichtigung hypothetischer Ermittlungsverlaufe im deut-
schen Strafverfahrensrecht: Jahn/Dallmeyer, NStZ 2005 297 et seqq. with further re-
ferences. 
117 BGHSt 27, 329 (21 December 1977); BGHSt 29, 244, at 249 (18 April 1980); 
BGHSt 34, 362 at 364 (28 April 1987); OLG Stuttgart NJW 1973, 1942. 
118 ECHRjudgrnent (30 June 2008) Gafgen v. Germany, Application no. 22978/05. 
119 LG Frankfurt StV 2003, 325: "Balancing the severity of the interference with the 
defendant's fundamental rights - in the present case the threat of physical violence - and 
the seriousness of the offence he was charged with and which had to be investigated - the 
completed murder of a child - makes the exclusion of evidence which has become known 
as a result of the defendant's statement - in particular the discovery of the dead child and 
the results of the autopsy - appear disproportionate". 
120 See supra note 118 as well as supra III.2.a). 
121 See supra note 118. 
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In its judgment122 the ECHR stresses that Article 3 of the Convention 
enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. The 
said article does not make any provision for exceptions and prohibits 
inhuman treatment such as Gafgen was subjected to. 
Consistent with previous case law the ECHR, however, conceded that it 
would not decide on the admissibility of a particular type of evidence, but 
only whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the 
evidence was obtained, had been fair. 123 
It pointed out that evidence recovered by measures found to be in 
breach of Article 3 of the Convention, such as Gafgen's confessions ob-
tained by means of torture or other ill-treatment, always raises serious 
questions as to the fairness of the proceedings 124 and most probably ren-
ders the proceedings as a whole unfair, irrespective of whether the admis-
sion of the evidence is decisive in securing the applicant's conviction. 125 
Nevertheless, dissecting the details of the case, the Court eventually 
concluded that the use of the specific items of indirect evidence in the 
Gafgen Case does not fall within the category of cases in which such use 
automatically renders the trial unfair under all circumstances, because the 
national courts had excluded not only the extracted statements as such, but 
also all other statements that might have been made as a result of the con-
tinuous effect of the ill-treatment in breach of Article 3. However, there 
were enough "reliable" items of evidence left in order to uphold Gafgen's 
conviction, like DNA tracks on the ransom and where the corpse was 
located. 126 
3. The Protection Against Unknowing Self-Incrimination: the Miranda 
paradigm 
a) Constitutional Provisions on Admonition of Right to Silence/Counsel 
The constitution does not offer an explicit provision protecting the defen-
dant from unknowing self-incrimination. But the Federal Court of Justice 
122 ECHRjudgment (30 June 2008) Gafgen v. Germany, Application no. 22978/05. 
123 ECHR judgment (30 June 2008) Gafgen v. Germany, Application no. 22978/05 
no. 97. 
124 ECHR judgment (30 June 2008) Gafgen v. Germany, Application no. 22978/05 
no. 98 with reference to Is;iiz v. Turkey (dee.), no. 54919/00, 9 January 2003; Jalloh, 
cited above,§§ 99, 104; Gi:is;men v. Turkey, no. 72000/01, § 73, (17 October 2006); and 
Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 36549/03, § 63, ECHR 2007). 
125 ECHR judgment (30 June 2008) Gafgen v. Germany, Application no. 22978/05 
no. 99 with reference to Harutyunyan, cited above;§§ 63, 66 and Gor;men, cited above, 
§§ 74-75. 
126 ECHR judgment (30 June 2008) Gafgen v. Germany, Application no. 22978/05 
no. 108. 
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decided in an early judgment that the Miranda-type127 warning of§ 136 (1) 
StPO expresses the basic position with regard to criminal procedure based 
on rule of law, according to which human dignity must be respected. 128 
b) Statutory Provisions on Admonition of Right to Silence/Counsel 
§ 136 (1) StPO and§ 163 a (3) and (4) oblige all law enforcement agencies 
to instruct a defendant: 129 "At the commencement of the first examination 
the accused shall be informed of the offense with which he[/she] is charged 
and of the applicable penal provisions. He[/she] shall be advised that the 
law grants him[/her] the right to respond to the accusation", or to remain 
silent, and at all times, "to consult with a defense counsel of his/her 
choice". 
c) High Court Jurisprudence Interpreting Effect of Violations of Above 
Provisions on Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence or Articulating 
Them in Case Law 
Whereas in previous case law, according to § 136 (1) StPO, advising the 
accused of his/her rights were not mandatory, but "advisory" and in case of 
default did not automatically result in the exclusion of confessions or self-
incriminating statements, 130 recent jurisprudence has established a different 
doctrine: Today the Federal Court of Justice ·sanctions violations of such 
qualified instruction duties. In principle evidence is excluded, if law en-
forcement agencies interrogate a person without giving prior and adequate 
information about his/her right to remain silent or to consult with a defense 
attomey. 131 In 1993 the Federal Court of Justice finally dismissed strong 
features coming from the inquisitorial model, emphasising that the defen-
dant was a party not an object of criminal proceedings. Legal scholars have 
embraced this decision. 132 Unlike in US or UK law, there is no formal 
charging in Germany. The instructions asked for by § 136 (1) StPO must 
be given "when the suspicion already present at the beginning of the inter-
rogation has so thickened that the suspect can seriously be considered a 
127 Unlike Miranda, however, this warning does not require the suspect to be in 
custody. For further information see: Thaman, 45 St. Louis L.J. 581at584. 
128 BGHSt 14, 361at364-365 (14 June 1960); see supra I.l. 
129 The duty to caution was introduced in 1964, albeit in a different mode; Gless, in: 
Jung/Leblois-Happe, to be published in 2009. 
130 See Judgement BGHSt 22, 129 (30 April 1968). See also Judgement BGHSt 22, 
170 (31 May 1968); BGHSt 31, 395 (7 June 1983). In 1974, the BGH held that the 
administration of the required warning in the judicial phase was mandatory. 
131 BGHSt 39, 349 at 352 (12 October 1993). 
132 RiejJ JR 1993, 334. 
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perpetrator of the investigated crime" .133 The duty to instruct arises regard-
less of who is conducting the interview, be it the police, the prosecution 
service or a judge. If the extraction of information, however, is not exer-
cised during a formal interview, the question of advising about rights is 
answered differently. 
aa) Official Interview of Defendant by Law Enforcement Agencies 
German courts oblige· law enforcement agencies to give qualified instruc-
tions to the suspect before official interviews are conducted. It is essential 
that the suspect's right to remain silent is not endangered and that the ac-
cused is aware of this privilege. The instruction has to be repeated should 
there be any doubts about comprehensibility on the suspect' s side. 134 Or, if 
an interrogator only learns during the questioning that a person examined 
as a witness actually turris out to be a suspect, he/she must not only inform 
the person of his/her right to have the privilege to refuse to give evidence, 
but also of the fact that nothing which had been said so far may be used as 
evidence in the subsequent proceedings ("qualifizierte Belehrung"). 135 
Although case law has been rather defendant-friendly, courts do grant 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule and admit statements gained during an 
interview without proper cautioning, if the accused knew his rights (e.g. 
fj 1. d" ) 136 ram ear 1er procee mgs . 
bb) Inofficial/Undercover Extraction of Information from the Defendant 
Case law struggles to handle information gathered during informal inter-
view situations, in particular in the context of secret surveillance and 
undercover investigations. In those instances qualified instruction duties 
may be neglected, and thus the suspect is exposed to undue conduct. For 
example, must a placement of an undercover agent in the cell of an incar-
cerated suspect lead to the exclusion of evidence? German law does not 
accept this kind of information as formal evidence, but grants the option to 
use such material as a lead to find further untainted evidence. 137 
133 BGH NStZ 2007, 653 at 654; BGHSt 37, 48 (31 May 1990); BGHSt 38, 214 at 
228 (27 February 1992); BGHSt 40, 211 (21July1994). 
134 BGHSt 39, 349 (12 October 1993). 
135 BGH Urteil vom 18 December 2008 - 4 StR 455/08 mit Anmerkung Gless/ 
Wennekers, to be published in Juristische Rundschau 2009; BGHSt 51, 367 (3 July 
2007). 
136 BGHSt 47, 172 (22 November 2001) (Pizzeria Murder): defendant knew from 
other criminal proceedings about his right to consult a lawyer and asked for one. 
137 BGHSt 34, 362 (28 April 1987); Schneider, Verdeckte Errnittlungen in Haft-
ansta!ten, NStZ 2001, 8. 
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In general the courts tend to admit information gathered by undercover 
police officers following roughly the rules governing evidence admission 
in cases of telephone tapping. Said rules render evidence inadmissible 
should a measure have been illegal from the beginning, but admit evidence 
if only minor formal regulations have been violated. 138 Admissibility of 
evidence is rejected, if an undercover agent purposely questions a defen-
dant in order to circumvent the privilege against self-incrimination. 139 In 
doing so he dirties his hands and taints the evidence. 
The admission of information obtained by private persons, including 
police informants, follows different rules, the focus being on the protection 
of privacy and a minimum standard of "fair trial" rather than on a clean 
hands approach. An illustrative example offers the case law on phone en-
trapments ("Horfallen"), during which a private person induces a defen-
dant to talk on the phone while police officers overhear the conversa-
tion.140 Such information is admissible as evidence, if it serves to prosecute 
a severe crime, and if otherwise the investigation would be probably less 
successful or significantly more difficult. 141 However, information gath-
ered with the help of private persons may be used as evidence in criminal 
proceedings, although with restrictions which guarantee a minimum of 
"fair trial" and privacy .142 If, for example, the police places a person into 
the cell of an incarcerated person, who cannot retreat into an own sphere of 
privacy, the information obtained may not be used as evidence, because 
law enforcement agents circumvent a formal interview including an advise 
on the defendants' rights etc on purpose. 143 
The courts justify the different rules of handling evidence gained in in-
formal undercover police questionings on the one hand, and formal ques-
tionings on the other hand, on the grounds that only during official interro-
gations the accused is confronted with the authority of law enforcement 
and thus has to react to a charge. 144 Whereas during informal interviews -
or rather private conversations - he/she is free to reveal some knowledge 
138 For further information see: Beulke (supra note 23) marginal number 48la. 
139 BGHSt 31, 304 (17 March 1983); BGH NJW 2007, 3138; see also BGHSt 33, 217 
(9 May 1985). 
140 BGHSt 39, 335 at 348 (8 October 1993); BGH NStZ 1995, 410 und 1996, 200 
with further references; see further: BVerfG NStZ 2000, 489. 
141 BGHSt 42, at 139-145 (13 May 1996): "zur Aufklarung einer Straftat von 
erheblicher Bedeutung, wenn die Erforschung des Sachverhalts unter Einsatz anderer 
Ermittlungsmethoden erheblich weniger erfolgversprechend und wesentlich erschwert 
gewesen ware". 
142 BGHSt 44, 129 (21 July 1998). 
143 BGHSt 34, 362 (28 April 1987). 
144 BGHSt 42 at 139-145 (13 May 1996); BGHSt 44, 129 (21 July 1998); Lesch, 
ZStW 111 (1999) 638; Milssig, GA 1999, 126 et seq. see also BVerfG NStZ 2000, 489. 
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or keep silent. Such a formalistic approach, however, is criticized, because 
it fails to take into consideration that both situations - formal and informal 
interrogations - serve law enforcement and thus must trigger the defen-
dants' rights. 145 · 
d) Admissibility of Indirect Evidence (Fruits of the Poisonous Tree/46 
As explained above, according to a prevailing view neither the fruit-of-the-
poisonous-tree-doctrine nor a strict rule against hearsay is accepted in 
Germany. Information gathered by actions of an undercover agent may, in 
principle, be funneled into the trial by questioning the contact officer, 
since hearsay evidence is admissible under certain circumstances and may 
be used as a lead. 147 
IV. Conclusion 
Summing up the report on German law and its use of illegally obtained 
evidence in criminal proceedings it must be emphasized that the doctrine 
aspires toward a coherent concept which fits into the general legal frame-
work, but does not present a clear-cut image. Until today the theories of 
admissibility of illegally gathered evidence rather give the impression of 
an emerging mosaic - although without a plan for completion. However, 
two basic patterns constantly recur: 
The first one forms Beling's clean hands-doctrine, which more recently 
is often combined with a "fair trial" -approach. 
Following this doctrine, the courts exclude evidence obtained in breach 
of procedural rules, not only if statutes like § 136a StPO ask for it explic-
itly, but also in other cases of grave breach - for example - of defendants' 
rights. In the latter cases, for instance, statements obtained by questioning 
suspects are excluded should qualified instructions prior to an official 
interview have been neglected. However, in certain situations German 
courts waive a claim and constantly weigh the interests of the defendant 
against broader law enforcement interests. This "balancing theory" has 
been constantly criticized in academia. Nevertheless it has to be noted that 
145 LR-Gless, § 136 marginal number 12; Roxin, NStZ 1995 18; Wesslau, ZStW 110 
(1998) 20 et seq. 
146 As with coerced or involuntary confessions, here the question is whether physical 
evidence found (weapon, drugs, etc.) may be used, even where the statement itself is 
non-usable. More sophisticated questions are whether a subsequent confession preceded 
by the proper admonitions, may be used following a confession taken without the proper 
admonitions. 
147 BGHSt 34, 362 (28 April 1987). 
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the approach of German jurisprudence is rather similar to the reasoning of 
French or English judges when it comes to the decision whether to exercise 
discretion to exclude evidence. The following aspects are considered: the 
severity of the breach versus the gravity of the offence imposed; the effect 
of the breach on the credibility of the evidence; the "technical" nature of 
the breach, following the assumption that the application of the correct 
procedure leads to lawfully obtained evidence. 
The second constant pattern concerns the protection of privacy. 
Following this doctrine, courts exclude evidence obtained or used 
involving a breach of the defendant's basic right to privacy pursuant to the 
constitution deducted from the "universal personality rights" ("allgemeines 
Personlichkeitsrecht"). The underlying theory is that, in view of the con-
stitution, there is an absolute sphere of privacy which bans the use of evi-
dence obviously stemming from a person's private life, such as diaries, 
tape-recordings of conversations in intimate/private surroundings etc. 
There are different possible explanations for the on-going development 
as well as for the lack of a master plan: (a) in a changing society with ever 
new technological inventions we constantly face new questions and chal-
lenges in this area; and (b) different legal frameworks have to be consid-
ered. Like other European jurisdictions, today's German criminal justice 
system is shaped by a code of criminal procedure dating from the nine-
teenth century, while, at the same time, based on a rather modem constitu-
tion, interpreted by ambitious courts. The German doctrine on exclusion-
ary rules reflects the patchwork combining those two basic regimes, and 
German jurisprudence strives to reconcile law enforcement interests with 
basic rights. 
German courts have handed down a complex and complicated body of 
case law with regard to the acceptance or refusal of illegally obtained evi-
dence. In spite of some struggle and - warranted - critique from academia, 
it is important to acknowledge that German jurisprudence has achieved a 
high standard when it comes to guarantee "due process" for which the pool 
of information that could lead to the establishment of gets restricted in 
order to protect the rights of the defendants. Thus, while it was tradition-
ally assumed that exclusionary rules are more prevalent in systems adher-
ing to the adversarial system, 148 Germany, coming from an inquisitorial 
regime, has moved towards the protection of the criminal suspects' right to 
a fair trial as well as the right to privacy by enforcing exclusionary rules. 
148 Weigend, 26 Harv.J.L. Pub.Pol'y, 157 at 168-9. 
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